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The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructur-
ing, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and owner-
ship changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-
held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-
group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The
central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the juris-
diction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The
central bank’s supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks,
and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally
different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had
no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.
INTRODUCTION
THE banking sector experienced drastic changes in post-crisis and post-SoehartoIndonesia. The changes occurred because the sector was severely hit by the
economic crisis, and also because it was placed at the center of the economic
reforms carried out under International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities. Some
of the major changes in the banking sector were the redeployment of actors and
institutions. Following a series of bank reconstruction measures, there were major
changes in the roster of owners of leading private banks. This change stands in stark
contrast to the situation in Thailand, where the four largest financial conglomerates
survived the crisis. Even domestically, the banking sector suffered a different fate
from the corporate sector, where the redeployment of actors that should have been
associated with corporate debt disposal has taken place only partially, and in a non-
transparent manner.
The financial institution, and the bank supervision system in particular, has un-
dergone major changes. Bank Indonesia, the central bank, which was formerly placed
under the executive branch of government and given only limited authority, was
legally guaranteed independence from the government and obtained broad author-
ity over banks. The risk management systems of individual banks and the deposit
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insurance system started to be institutionalized. Though introduced at the initiative
of the IMF, these institutional reforms represent a fresh effort to build a financial
institution that was never functional under the Soeharto regime.
Indonesia’s banking crisis, which “proved to be one of the most serious in any
country in the world in the twentieth century” (Enoch et al. 2001, p. 8), has drawn
much research interest. There have been two major streams of research: policy
research designed to derive policy implications from the Indonesian experiences,1
and empirical research which analyzes the functions and structure of the Indone-
sian financial sector from such aspects as monetary policy, financial intermedia-
tion, and banks’ financial conditions.2 This paper, however, aims to evaluate the
banking reform from a different perspective from these specialized financial analy-
ses. One of the angles is an actor analysis, examining who emerged as new actors
after bank restructuring and how these actors reacted to the new institutional envi-
ronment. The second is a comparative analysis of the financial institution to find
out whether post-crisis reform has brought about any fundamental changes in the
financial institution built under the pre-crisis Soeharto regime. The task of this pa-
per is to evaluate the bank reform from these two points of view and to consider its
significance in Indonesia’s economic reorganization. Bank reconstruction has been
completed at the cost of imposing enormous costs on state finance, and transferring
the task of collecting nonperforming loans to a governmental asset management
organization. This paper does not directly address the issues of the fiscal burden or
loan collection, however.
Section I of this paper provides a general view of the Indonesian banking sector
after the crisis, and Section II is devoted to a review of major actors and the banking
institution before the crisis. Section III sheds light on the post-crisis redeployment
of actors, while Section IV addresses institutional reforms. Section V examines the
features of post-restructuring management reform at major banks. Based on these
discussions, the concluding section considers the significance of institutional re-
form in the banking sector.
I. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE BANKING SECTOR
AROUND THE CRISIS
Table I provides an overview of structural changes in the banking sector around the
time of the crisis. The total number of commercial banks declined by 37 percent
from 239 at the end of 1996 to 151 at the end of 2000, as the closure of banks ran its
1 Papers from the IMF and World Bank played a leading role. For example, see Enoch (2000), Enoch
et al. (2001), and Pangestu and Habir (2002).
2 For example, see Komatsu (2003) for monetary policy and financial intermediation, and Takeda
(2002) and Bank Indonesia, DPNP, BSSK (2003) for an analysis of banks’ financial fundamentals.
Other references include Ary Suta and Musa (2003).
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course. While the size of assets in the banking sector (relative to GDP) rose margin-
ally during the same period, the balance of outstanding loans dwindled to 21 from
55 percent of GDP, following the transfer of nonperforming loans to the Indonesian
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).3 The ratio of lending to total assets also de-
clined significantly, while claims on the central government, or government bonds
injected by the government into the banking sector, increased to around 40 percent
of total assets. As a result of a public capital injection (recapitalization) worth 658
trillion rupiahs (52 percent of GDP in 2000), the ratio of capital to total assets
turned positive by 2000. The nonperforming loan ratio declined to a normal level
by 2002. The banking sector climbed out of its critical state thanks to the emer-
gency treatment, but the pace of the recovery of financial intermediation has been
slow since 2002 in terms of lending activity, due in part to more stringent risk
management by banks after the reform.
The ownership structure of the banking sector also changed (Table II). Compar-
ing the situation before the crisis to that after bank restructuring, the weight of
TABLE  I
MAIN INDICATORS FOR THE BANKING SECTOR AROUND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, 1996–2003
(%)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
No. of commercial banks 239 222 208 164 151 145 142 138
Total assets (ratio to nominal GDP) 72.8 84.3 79.8 71.8 77.8 70.9 65.8 63.9
Total loans (ratio to nominal GDP) 55.0 60.2 51.0 20.5 21.3 21.0 22.7 26.6
Loan to deposit ratio 104.0 105.7 85.0 36.0 37.3 38.0 43.2 54.3
Loans / total assets 75.6 71.5 63.9 28.5 27.3 29.6 34.5 41.6
Claims on government / total assets 0.2 0.2 0.1 34.0 43.6 39.3 35.7 30.2
Capital / total assets 9.6 8.8 −12.9 −2.7 5.1 6.4 8.8 9.7
Nonperforming loan ratio (gross) 9.3 19.8 58.7 32.8 18.8 12.1 8.3 8.1
Nonperforming loan ratio (net) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.1 3.6 2.9 1.8
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various issues); Bank Indonesia,
Annual Report (various years).
Notes: 1. “Claims on government” of banks on the central government consist mainly of
government bonds injected for banks’ recapitalization.
2. The nonperforming loan ratios for 1996–98 are figures for the end of each fiscal
year (the end of March 1997–the end of March 1999).
3. Nonperforming loan ratio (gross) = nonperforming loans / total outstanding
loans × 100.
Nonperforming loan ratio (net) = (nonperforming loans − reserves) / total outstand-
ing loans × 100.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 Nonperforming loans transferred from the banking sector to IBRA amounted to 236 trillion rupi-
ahs (as of the end of 1999), or equivalent to 49 percent of outstanding loans. The ratio of claims
collected by IBRA from indebted companies was finally just 28 percent when IBRA was dissolved
in February 2004.
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private and state banks was reversed. State banks fell in number from seven to five,
but their composition ratio in terms of assets rose from 36 percent in 1996 to 50
percent in 2000. On the other hand, the number of private banks was halved, as 67
banks accounting for 16 percent of assets (as of 1996) closed, and their asset com-
position declined from 52 to 35 percent in the same period. Some were subject to
reconstruction and temporarily became government-owned banks, accounting for
27 percent of total assets (or 78 percent of private bank assets). As the government’s
shares in those banks were later sold off, in all cases to consortiums of foreign
investors, foreign-owned private banks emerged as a new category, accounting for
21 percent of total bank assets in 2002. Combined with foreign bank branches and
foreign-joint banks, the composition of foreign-affiliated banks reached 31 percent
of bank assets as a whole, up substantially from 9 percent before the crisis.
Table III compares the ten largest commercial banks before and after the crisis. It
clearly shows a shift of ownership from state and business groups to state and for-
eign capital. The share of the ten largest banks in total commercial bank assets,
which was already a high 66 percent in 1996, rose further to 72 percent in 2002. In
particular, Bank Mandiri, which emerged from a consolidation of four state banks,
became a mega bank, accounting for 24 percent of total assets by itself. The top
banks with a high concentration of assets, with the exception of Citibank, were all
failed banks that have been supported by reconstruction measures.
II. MAJOR ACTORS AND THE BANKING INSTITUTION
BEFORE THE CRISIS
A. State Control and the First Financial Liberalization—Domination of the Banking
Sector by State Banks
Indonesia’s banking sector4 was founded as a state-owned undertaking during
the Soekarno era. The Soeharto government inherited and relaunched it, revamping
the legal framework.5 President Soeharto enacted a major shift in basic economic
policy from state capital supremacy to private and foreign capital utilization. In the
banking sector, new entries were permitted for local private banks in 1966 and for
foreign banks in 1968. However, permissions for the establishment of local private
4 There is an accumulation of literature on the development of the Indonesian banking sector up to
the 1997 economic crisis. For the period before the first financial liberalization, see Nasution (1983).
For the process of financial liberalization after 1983, see Cole and Slade (1996), McLeod (1994),
MacIntyre (1993), Nasution (1996), Hendrobudiyanto (1994), and Komatsu (1994, 1998).
5 A setup of one central bank and seven state banks was established under the Banking Act of 1967
and the Central Bank Act of 1968. Bank Indonesia, the central bank, has its roots in De Javasche
Bank, a commercial bank in the Dutch colonial era, while the seven state banks stemmed from six
Dutch and British banks and four state banks created after independence. The overwhelming su-
premacy of the state banks was established as the state took over all the foreign assets that had
formed the core of the colonial economy.
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banks were halted in mid-1968 when the number reached 122, while the entry of
foreign banks was allowed only for 11 banks6 in 1968. For the ensuing full two
decades, no additional entries were permitted for either local or foreign banks. Con-
trary to the basic open-door policy, state ownership was maintained intentionally in
the banking sector. In fact, state banks consistently accounted for 70–80 percent of
the total assets of commercial banks from 1968 to the first financial liberalization in
1983 (Nasution 1996, p. 9; Sato 1992, pp. 226–27).
The Soeharto government transformed the banking sector from a mere state-
owned business into a state-controlled business that could play a key role in the
developmental regime. To this end, the following institutions were created. The
first was the principle of balanced budgets. In 1967, a ban was imposed on govern-
ment borrowings from banks, and balanced state revenues and expenditures were
mandated after 1968. This put a halt to the longstanding malpractice of using the
banking sector to cover fiscal deficits, and established a mechanism for directing
financial resources from the banking sector to the corporate sector (Cole and Slade
1996, p. 354).
The second was the direct and indirect credit system of the central bank. Bank
Indonesia, the central bank, provided financing to the corporate sector through di-
rect credit and indirect credit.7 Indirect credit, called central bank “liquidity credit,”
is the system under which the central bank provided state banks with funds for
lending to priority sectors. The central bank’s direct and indirect credit accounted
for 72 percent of all bank lending (including lending by the central bank) in 1968.
Despite the subsequent decline, the share still averaged 48 percent during the 21
years until the second financial liberalization (Sato 1992, p. 223; MacIntyre 1993,
p. 148). Policy finance provided by the central bank and state banks thus became a
channel, along with fiscal investment, for supplying development funds.
Third, the government introduced preferential lending rates and credit ceilings.
In 1969, the government established an official interest system under which prefer-
ential interest rates were set by sector. Later, the priority sectors were expanded and
interest rates were lowered. Real interest rates, which were positive in the period of
declining interest rates following the end to hyperinflation, turned negative from
1973 when inflation began to increase (Figure 1). State banks were able to expand
lending at an average real interest rate of −5 percent during the 1974–82 oil-boom
period, thanks to the central bank’s indirect credit underpinned by the government’s
ample oil revenues, but there was a need to place a ceiling on the lending amount.
6 Branches of ten foreign banks and a joint-venture bank set up by the Daiwa Bank of Japan.
7 Major destinations for Bank Indonesia’s direct and indirect credits were BULOG (National Food
Logistics Agency), the state oil corporation Pertamina, investment credit, agricultural financing
called Bimas for rice production increases, and lending to the manufacturing sector (MacIntyre
1993, p. 150). With the exception of credits to Pertamina to finance debt repayments, the central
bank credits were primarily intended for the stable supply of food and promotion of industrial
development.
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This is why a ceiling was imposed on the lending of all commercial banks in 1974.
With 1973 as the turning point, the state bank financing system thus changed in
nature from priority sector lending based on mobilized deposits to subsidized lend-
ing associated with full control over interest rates, lending amount, and sectors to
be targeted by funds from the central bank.
As the oil boom drew to an end in 1982, the banking sector found itself unable to
maintain its role as a conduit for development funds. Indonesia had no choice but to
follow the guidance of the World Bank and IMF and implement economic liberal-
ization through a structural adjustment program. In June 1983, the government
launched its first financial liberalization, fully liberalizing the deposit and lending
rates of state banks and removing credit ceilings on all banks. Consequently, state
banks raised both deposit and lending rates, leading to a sharp rise in the average
real interest rate from −5.0 to 8.2 percent (Figure 1). In 1983–87, the balance of
deposits at all commercial banks rose steeply, by an annual average of 25 percent,
Fig. 1. Real Interest Rate and Financial Deepening, 1968–94
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Cole and Slade (1996, pp.
10, 18).
Note: Real interest rate is the average of one-year deposit interest
rates at state banks, deflated by inflation rates.
Period (Average)
1968–73 1974–82 1983–87 1988–94
Real interest rate (%) 6.7 −5.0 8.2 8.5
M2/GDP (%) 10.3 15.3 23.4 39.0
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and the balance of outstanding loans also increased by an annual average of 26
percent, with the ratio of M2 to GDP growing to an average of 23 percent from 15
percent in the preceding period. In line with the McKinnon-Shaw model, the re-
moval of control over interest rates and lending was credited with helping eliminate
“financial repression,” facilitating financial deepening and expanding the banking
sector’s financial intermediation function.8
While the banking system was transformed from state control to market orienta-
tion, restrictions on new entries were maintained, leaving the absolute supremacy
of state banks intact. Under the restricted competition, banks gained discretion over
interest rates and lending, real interest rates turned positive, and inflation remained
relatively low. Consequently, the rent, which had previously been distributed to the
corporate sector under the preferential lending system, came to remain within the
banking sector, giving rise to a situation close to “financial restraint” as described
by Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz. If so, how did banks use that rent? The differ-
entials between deposit and lending rates at state banks widened after the financial
liberalization (Komatsu 1997), indicating that they were securing rent. However,
state banks opened fewer new branches and had lower growth rates in lending com-
pared to private banks. While private banks were quick to acquire new customers,
state banks apparently failed to make effective use of the emerging rent in improv-
ing bank management, due to their antiquated management practices.9
B. The Second Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulations—Emergence
of Business-Group-Affiliated Banks
In October 1988, the Indonesian government announced a second financial liber-
alization, removing restrictions on new entries into the banking sector. Specifically,
it: (1) liberalized the entry of private banks; (2) liberalized the entry of foreign
banks through joint ventures; and (3) eased requirements for the opening of branches
by all banks. As a result, many new private banks were established. In the five years
up to 1993, the number of private banks rose 2.5 times, from 63 to 158, and the
number of branches more than 5 times, from 559 to 2,926. Despite little change in
real interest rates, the ratio of M2 to GDP rose sharply from 23 to 39 percent, as a
sole result of the quantitative expansion of the banking market through the liberal-
8 See Komatsu (1994) and Nasution (1994). According to Cole and Slade (1996, pp. 100–104), the
IMF recommended a gradual liberalization based on the McKinnon-Shaw model, while the World
Bank was cautious about financial liberalization for fear that higher real interest rates would cause
a credit crunch. Eventually, the Indonesian government opted for a liberalization more radical than
the IMF plan.
9 The problems besetting state banks may include weakness in developing new customers, an in-
crease in unprofitable projects due to higher lending rates, the emergence of nonperforming loans
as a result of decreased indirect credit from the central bank (Komatsu 1998), a maturity mismatch
between medium-term investment credits and deposits whose maturities became shorter, and the
unchanged patterns of behavior common to state bureaucratic organizations.
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ization of entry (Figure 1). New indirect credit by the central bank was halted in
1990, with the exception of agricultural credit, and the previously strong state con-
trol over the banking sector was almost completely eliminated.
The second financial liberalization brought about a change in the principal play-
ers in the banking sector. The share of the seven state banks in total commercial
bank assets declined from 63 percent in 1988 to 38 percent in 1996, while the share
of private banks more than doubled from 24 to 52 percent. Since a minimum amount
of capital was the only requirement for setting up a bank, many business groups,
which until then had been shut out of the lucrative banking industry, established
their own banks. Thus, business-group-affiliated banks replaced state banks as the
principal players in the banking sector.
This full liberalism policy line was modified with the introduction of prudential
regulations in February 1991. The new regulations included: (1) a requirement that
all banks meet a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 8 percent by the end of 1993;10 (2)
the introduction of new ratio-based standards of soundness and a point-rating sys-
tem for all banks; and (3) the granting to the central bank of the authority to issue
cease-and-desist orders to any bank defying its guidance. The prudential regula-
tions were prepared by the central bank, which was under pressure to design a bank
supervision system after the Ministry of Finance took the initiative in liberalizing
entry, under a division of roles empowering the Minister of Finance to issue and
revoke banking licenses and the central bank to supervise banks.
Beginning in 1991, Indonesia successively introduced institutions designed to
ensure the soundness of banks. In 1992, the new Banking Act (Act No. 7 of 1992)
was enacted to replace the Banking Act of 1967. It provided for the implementation
of prudential regulations, administrative sanctions against noncompliant banks,
criminal penalties for bank managers and employees, a “legal lending limit”11 re-
stricting intra-group lending, and a division of roles between the central bank and
the Minister of Finance for supervising unsound banks. The central bank required
all banks to issue quarterly financial statements, revamped the loan loss reserve
fund system, introduced an early warning system, and established the first domestic
credit rating organization, while the Ministry of Finance raised the minimum capi-
tal required for the establishment of new banks.
Despite these efforts to develop bank supervision systems, nonperforming loans
actually increased and a series of banking scandals occurred. This points to the
10 Based on the December 1987 Accord of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (Cooke Com-
mittee) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is the
ratio of capital to risk-weighted total assets.
11 The “legal lending limit: LLL” (Batas Maksimum Pemberian Kredit, BMPK) was the first pruden-
tial regulation incorporated into the second financial liberalization measures in 1988. The limit,
applicable to a single borrower, group of borrowers, company owned by bank shareholders or bank
managers, or business group, was intended to forestall concentrated lending and to restrict lending
within business groups.
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absence of an institutional environment allowing prudential regulations to be effec-
tive. The first conceivable cause is the excessive liberalization of entry, which made
it difficult for banks to maintain their financial soundness. Banks were confronted
not only with increased costs resulting from intensified competition, but also faced
higher market risks, since blue-chip companies had exited after the financial liber-
alization, leaving only second-rate borrowers behind in the domestic banking mar-
ket, following a shift in fundraising by reputable companies from the domestic to
international money market (Nasution 1994; Komatsu 1997).12 Borrowers with po-
litical and bureaucratic connections swarmed to the state banks, leading to a rise in
huge loans to projects run by those well-connected business groups. Despite this,
the state banks managed to meet the numerical CAR standards through such means
as purchases of central bank money market securities called Sertifikat Bank Indo-
nesia (SBI). The implementation of the restrictions on intra-group lending by group-
affiliated banks was practically removed, as the grace period for compliance was
extended. Thus the central bank’s prudential regulations eventually became stultified.
The second factor was the limitations on bank supervision by the central bank.
The foreign exchange loss incident at Bank Duta in 1990 highlighted the rampant
dressing of financial statements by banks, and the consequent difficulty for the
central bank to evaluate banks on the basis of accurate information. In 1992 Bank
Summa was closed due to a financial failure stemming from intra-group real
estate finance. The central bank was unable to prevent its failure despite several
rounds of direct guidance, exposing the limitations of central bank supervision
(Hendrobudiyanto 1994). While the central bank’s power was expanded under the
Banking Act of 1992, institutionally it remained under the control of the govern-
ment, and had very limited supervisory authority.
The third potential cause was the lack of exit rules for banks. Even after the
banking sector shifted from state control to a market orientation, state banks of
course, but private banks as well, tacitly assumed that the government would pro-
tect them, and believed that bank closures were unconceivable. The Bank Summa
incident sent shock waves through the banking community as the first instance of a
bank closure under the Soeharto regime, but failed to mark a first step toward pre-
paring exit rules, with implications that were inconsistent with market principles.
While Bank Duta was rescued, Bank Summa was shut down, presumably because
of the difference between the two banks in terms of their closeness to the Soeharto
12 The shift in fundraising by banks and companies to overseas financial market was due to an in-
crease in foreign exchange banks following the liberalization, the central bank’s creation of the
foreign exchange swap facility, and the removal of the ceiling on banks’ overseas borrowings in
1989. But banks were subject to the net open position (NOP) regulation that restricted the net
balance of foreign-currency-denominated assets and liabilities to within 25 percent of capital, while
companies faced no restrictions regarding overseas borrowings (for state-owned enterprises and
state banks, restrictions were introduced in 1991). Consequently Indonesian companies procured
funds overseas more aggressively than did banks.
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government. Bank Duta was owned by foundations (yayasan) affiliated with Presi-
dent Soeharto. Bank Summa, on the other hand, was owned by the eldest son of the
founder of Astra Group, the largest Indonesian automaker. In clearing Bank Summa’s
debts, the founding family of Astra Group was forced to sell off all their shares in
the group’s holding company as collateral, allowing business groups close to Soeharto
to become major shareholders in Astra Group, and effectively leading to the take-
over of the top automaker by President Soeharto. The Bank Summa incident left a
message for many banks that they would not be crushed as long as they did not fall
into disfavor with the Soeharto government. It is likely that the lack of market exit
rules and the tacit guarantees by the Soeharto regime were responsible for the banks’
pursuit of near-term interests without taking risks into consideration.
III. THE POST-CRISIS REDEPLOYMENT OF ACTORS
A. The Collapse of Business-Group-Affiliated Banks
As the Asian currency crisis spread to Indonesia in July 1997, the government
officially enlisted the support of the IMF on October 31 in an effort to preempt a
further deepening of the crisis. On November 1, it closed 16 private banks as the
first measure of bank reconstruction. The Letter of Intent (LoI) signed the previous
day listed financial sector reform as one of the three major policy initiatives that
Indonesia intended to implement with IMF support. This indicates that both the
Indonesian government and the IMF viewed the increasing lack of soundness of the
banking sector, despite the booming economy, as a major problem. In fact, in its
preliminary consultations with the IMF, the government presented a plan for the
resolution of a total of 50 banks (Enoch et al. 2001, p. 124).
The banking crisis in Indonesia, which at first was limited to specific unsound
banks, subsequently developed into an overall systemic crisis. The foremost factor
behind this development was the financial unrest generated by the political instabil-
ity and the accelerating currency decline after December 1997. However, bank re-
construction measures, which began with the sudden closure of 16 banks, were in
themselves the second factor that helped magnify the unrest. Major problems in the
bank reconstruction process included the fact that the criteria for closing or recon-
structing banks remained unclear until March 1999,13 that the introduction of the
13 It was finally decided that the capital adequacy ratio served as the criteria for bank closure and
reconstruction. In principle, banks with a CAR of less than −25% were closed, those with a CAR of
−25% to less than 4% and satisfying certain necessary conditions were recapitalized, though those
that did not meet the conditions were closed, and those with a CAR of above 4% did not undergo
reconstruction measures. The necessary conditions included that directors and commissioners of a
bank pass the “fit and proper” test conducted by IBRA, and that bank shareholders raise 20% of the
capital necessary to achieve a CAR of 4% (the remaining 80% was injected by the government via
government bonds). While all seven state banks had a CAR of less than −25%, they were still
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blanket guarantee for bank deposits was delayed until January 1998, and that the
authority of IBRA was not legally clarified until 13 months after its establishment.
Ultimately, there were five rounds of bank closures and nationalization between
November 1997 and March 1999, the recapitalization of reconstructed banks was
carried out toward the end of 2000, and government-held shares in nationalized and
recapitalized banks were almost sold off by 2004. The bank reconstruction on a
scale far larger than initially expected was all but completed in seven years.14
The five rounds of bank reconstruction measures resulted in the closure of 67
private banks (accounting for 16% of total commercial bank assets at the end of
1996), the nationalization of 12 private banks (20%), and the recapitalization of all
7 state banks (36%), 7 private banks (8%), and 12 (3%) of a total of 27 regional
development banks. The number of nationalized and recapitalized banks reached
38, together accounting for as much as 67% of the banking sector’s total assets.
Seen from the angle of bank ownership, no state or regional bank was shut down.
The assets of state and regional banks expanded as a result of the recapitalization,
with no change in ownership. By contrast, 41% of private banks, accounting for a
total of 31% of total private bank assets, were closed. Another 4% of private banks,
accounting for 46% of assets, were nationalized or recapitalized, and experienced
ownership changes. Changes of ownership took place mainly at banks affiliated
with business groups. Of 42 business-group-affiliated banks, which accounted for
38% of all commercial bank assets prior to the crisis, only 7, with a combined ratio
of 2% of total bank assets, survived without ownership changes (Table IV). Of the
survivors, only Bank Panin was a leading bank, with the rest being small banks
operated by business groups as peripheral business. Among banks not affiliated
with business groups, there were more survivors than closures. Thus, the collapse
of business-group-affiliated banks was the most notable change that occurred in the
bank reconstruction process.
A new leading actor in the private banking sector that replaced group-affiliated
banks was a new category—foreign-owned private banks. Government-held shares
in reconstructed group-affiliated banks were mostly sold off to consortiums of non-
bank foreign investors. Unlike in Thailand, there were no cases of single-handed
acquisitions by foreign banks. This paper calls the former group-affiliated banks
“foreign-owned banks,” to make a distinction with existing foreign bank branches
and joint ventures with foreign banks, which are termed “foreign banks.”
 The main owners of foreign-owned banks are Asian capital, mostly from
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea (Table V). Bank Central Asia of
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
reconstructed, instead of being shut down. Of private banks with a CAR of −25% to less than 4%,
those that had more than 80,000 deposit accounts were recapitalized after being temporarily placed
under state control (in other words, nationalized).
14 For the course of the five rounds of bank reconstruction, see Enoch (2000), Enoch et al. (2001),
Pangestu and Habir (2002), Takeda (2000), Komatsu (2003), and Ary Suta and Musa (2003).
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TABLE  IV
DECLINE OF BUSINESS-GROUP-AFFILIATED BANKS, 1996 AND 1999
1996 1999
Business-group-affiliateda 42 37.6 Business-group-affiliateda
Existing after the crisis 7 2.0 Existing 7b 2.2
Nationalized 4 16.7
Recapitalized 3 6.8
Closed 23 9.9
Integrated with other banks 5 2.2
Formerly business-
 group-affiliated 7c 29.3
Independent 122 13.3 Independent
Existing after the crisis 78 7.1 Existing 67 6.7
Closed 44 6.1
Total of private banks 164 50.9 Total of private banks 81 38.1
Total of all commercial Total of all commercial
banks 239 100.0 banks 152 100.0
Source: Calculated based on Ekofin Konsulindo (2000).
a Includes all banks owned by the top 50 business groups in the 1996 sales ranking, based on
Warta ekonomi 9, no. 27 (1997).
b The number dropped to six after one bank was closed in October 2001.
c The number dropped to six after one bank was consolidated in September 2002.
Asset
Composition
(%)
No.
of
Banks
Affiliation with
Business Groups
Asset
Composition
(%)
No.
of
Banks
Affiliation with
Business Groups
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
the Salim Group was purchased by a consortium of investors composed of an Ameri-
can investment firm and Djarum Group. The former is believed to be actually owned
by Asian capital, while the latter is an Indonesian Chinese business group with a
core business interest in clove tobacco. Through this, foreign and domestic inves-
tors with no expertise in banking became the new owners of the formerly largest
and best-quality bank in Indonesia. Bank Danamon, which was once the core op-
eration of Indonesian Chinese Danamon Group, was sold off to a consortium of
investors made up of Singapore’s government-affiliated Temasek Group and
Deutsche Bank of Germany, while Bank Niaga was sold to a consortium of Malay-
sian investors. These three banks were former group-affiliated banks that had been
nationalized. Of the recapitalized former group-affiliated banks, Bank International
Indonesia (BII), the core bank of the Sinar Mas Group—the third largest business
group after Salim and Astra—was sold to a consortium of Temasek Group of
Singapore and Kookmin Bank, a private Korean bank. The former owners of these
banks were totally driven out in all cases except BCA, and the Salim family, which
previously controlled BCA, completely relinquished its control rights.
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B. Major Actors in the Post-restructuring Banking Sector
The major actors in the post-restructuring banking sector can be classified as
follows by ownership and reconstruction measures: (a) state banks; (b) former busi-
ness-group-affiliated banks that became foreign-owned after nationalization; (c)
former business-group-affiliated banks that were recapitalized (two of three such
banks later became foreign-owned); (d) private banks that avoided reconstruction
measures (mostly independent private banks with the exception of Bank Panin); (e)
foreign banks; and (f) regional development banks.
Table VI compares the average size of assets per bank and key financial indica-
tors after classifying all commercial banks with total assets above 10 trillion rupi-
ahs into the above-mentioned (a) to (f) (for regional development banks, the top
five are included, as even the largest has total assets of only 8 trillion rupiahs). The
table shows that, in terms of asset size, state banks dwarf the others, and there is a
clear hierarchical structure: the asset size of nationalized former group-affiliated
banks is half that of state banks, that of recapitalized former group-affiliated banks
half of that, that of independent and foreign-bank-affiliated banks half of that, and
that of regional development banks less than half of that.
Looking at financial indicators, state banks and nationalized former group-
affiliated banks have similar, medium-range levels of loan-deposit ratios, profit ra-
tios, and efficiency indicators (net interest margins and expense ratios). However,
state banks, despite the massive recapitalization, have the lowest CAR and rela-
tively high nonperforming loan ratios, indicating that they have been slow in achiev-
ing financial improvement. Conversely, the latter have the highest CAR, but this
points to heavy dependence on the government bonds used for recapitalization, and
together with the low loan-deposit ratios, indicates an inadequate recovery of financial
intermediation functions. The worst performers are recapitalized former business-
group-affiliated banks. Despite some recovery in CAR, the nonperforming loan
ratios here are high, profit ratios are negative, and expense ratios exceed 100 per-
cent, indicating that these banks, as business entities, are still mired in a crisis situ-
ation.
By contrast, the private banks that did not adopt reconstruction measures are
leading the functional recovery of the banking sector. They maintain adequate lev-
els of CAR and nonperforming loan ratios, as well as the highest loan-deposit ra-
tios. In particular, Bank Panin and Bank NISP have loan-deposit ratios close to 80
percent, showing that they are leading the recovery of bank lending. Foreign bank
branches have the highest profit ratios and efficiency levels, but their nonperforming
loan ratios are surprisingly high, ranging from 20 to 30 percent, except for the top-
ranking Citibank. Regional development banks, though very small in terms of asset
size, excel in efficiency and profit ratios and have the lowest nonperforming loan
ratios. Three of these five banks under review were recapitalized, but managed to
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improve their financial indicators far more than larger-scale banks. While due cau-
tion is necessary regarding the recent emphasis on consumer finance, it is deemed
that they are likely to play a key role in financial intermediation as locally oriented
banks in their respective regional economies.
As seen above, in terms of size, the state banks and nationalized former business-
group-affiliated banks can be described as the principal actors in the post-restruc-
turing Indonesian banking sector, and in terms of financial intermediation function,
it is the independent private banks that have not implemented reconstruction mea-
sures that can be seen as the main actors.
IV. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM AFTER THE CRISIS
Indonesia’s first Letter of Intent to the IMF cited the improvement of “the institu-
tional, legal, and regulatory framework for banking operations to ensure the emer-
gence of a sound and efficient financial system” as one of the reforms of the financial
sector. The IMF and central bank found that the prudential regulations introduced
before the crisis not only contained loopholes, but that there were also problems
with the very legal framework that made these regulations effective. Thus, together
with bank reconstruction, financial institution reform was pushed forward in line
with the IMF recommendations. This section addresses two key reform issues: bank
supervision system and deposit insurance system.
A. The Shake-Up of the Bank Supervision System
One of the fundamental reasons behind the lack of effectiveness of the pre-crisis
prudential regulations was the limited authority of the central bank in bank supervi-
sion. In a narrow sense, this involved the division of powers between the Minister
of Finance and the central bank. In a broader context, it involved the central bank’s
independence from the government and the president.15
Under pressure from the IMF’s requests and the deconcentration of power after
the fall of President Soeharto, moves were carried out to create a legal framework
for ensuring the independence of the central bank. First, in the 1998 amendment of
the Banking Act, the separation of authority under which the Minister of Finance
was empowered to issue banking licenses, while the central bank was limited to
bank supervision, was scrapped, and the central bank was given all powers from the
issuance and revocation of banking licenses to the imposition of administrative
sanctions. In May 1999, the new Central Bank Act (Act No. 23 of 1999) was en-
acted, replacing the Central Bank Act of 1968. The new act explicitly states that the
central bank is “an independent national institution, which is free from intervention
15 President Soeharto’s sudden dismissal of the central bank governor in February 1998, due to his
opposition to the planned pegging of the Indonesian currency to the U.S. dollar, left a strong im-
pression that the president would intervene politically in the central bank.
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of the Government.” It also describes the functions of the central bank as, primarily,
currency and monetary policy and, secondarily, bank control and supervision, and
prohibits intervention in these areas by any other organization. With regard to the
appointment of the governor and other board members, the president proposes can-
didates to the House of Representatives and makes appointments with parliamen-
tary consent, in an arrangement for common decision making by the executive and
legislative bodies. However, neither was given the right of dismissal. These two
new laws freed the central bank from the power hierarchy with the president at the
apex, allowing it to acquire a status matching that of the president and the House of
Representatives (Figures 2.A and 2.B).
This structure evolved further with the 2004 amendment of the Central Bank Act
of 1999 (Act No. 3 of 2004) (Figure 2.C). The amendment established a relation-
ship of checks and balances among the president, House of Representatives and
central bank out of reflection that the preoccupation with the independence of the
central bank led to the disregard of supervision over the central bank. The amend-
ment introduced three major changes. First, the Supervisory Board (Badan
Supervisi), comprising experts chosen by the House of Representatives and ap-
pointed by the president, supervises the central bank. Second, the central bank is
required to make regular reports to the House of Representatives and the president
for evaluation by the House of Representatives. Third, the president is empowered
to dismiss governors of the central bank when they commit prohibited acts but
refuse to resign on their own.
The system of bank supervision by the central bank was also improved in three
areas: contents of supervision programs, development of the central bank’s super-
visory capability, and implementation of supervision. In 1999, with the assistance
of the World Bank, the central bank formulated “a master strategy for strengthening
Bank Indonesia’s regulatory, supervisory, and examination activities.” In line with
this strategy, its bank supervision was improved drastically, with the frequency of
audits increased from once in three years to annually, under a new risk-based super-
visory program. In addition, its supervisory function was revamped on the basis of
the results of an assessment of nine units related to bank supervision.16 An impor-
tant point in implementing supervision was the institutionalization of sanctions
against noncompliant banks and exits from the market of financially failed banks.
The 1998 amendment of the Banking Act toughened criminal penalties against bank-
ers, made shareholders subject to criminal penalties, and clarified the contents of
sanctions. As for failed banks, the experience of the crisis itself was the first step
toward the development of exit rules. Banks that failed to satisfy the qualifications
were closed or nationalized, even if they were candidates for reconstruction. Even
16 See the Letter of Intent of the Indonesian government to the IMF dated March 16, 1999 and July
22, 1999 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/mempub.asp).
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after March 1999, banks that could not achieve the targets of financial improve-
ment indicators set by the central bank were shut down one by one. Moreover, the
presence of the IMF ensured the resolute closure of unqualified banks. Indonesia’s
banking sector experienced an unprecedented disciplining through these develop-
ments.
It must be noted that the IMF placed particular importance on the independence
of the central bank only for the sake of maintaining an independent currency and
monetary policy. It envisioned separating the bank supervision function from the
central bank and establishing an integrated supervisory framework for overall
financial services. Korea, acting promptly on the IMF’s recommendations, estab-
lished a Financial Supervisory Committee (FSC) as early as in February 1998. For
Fig. 2. Position and Functions of the Central Bank
A. Under the Soeharto Regime (1968–98)
Issuance & revocation
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Bank Indonesia
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Source: Nasution (1983, p. 64) and the author.
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Indonesia, the IMF proposed the establishment of the Financial Service Authority
(Otorita Jasa Keuangan, OJK), with the task of supervising and regulating four
sectors: banks, security markets, insurance firms, and pension funds.17 However,
the establishment of the authority was not realized by 2002 as initially stipulated,
and was eventually postponed until 2010.
Behind this delay was strong opposition from the central bank. As discussed
earlier, the function of the central bank was divorced from the supervision of bank
soundness, as its function during the Soekarno era had been to cover fiscal deficits,
and in the early half of the Soeharto administration had been to provide national
development funds. While bank supervision became necessary during the latter
half of the Soeharto period, the central bank’s authority was severely limited. It
feared that it would be deprived of supervisory powers just as it finally achieved its
independence from the Ministry of Finance and politics in the post-crisis reform. In
fact, it is true that the central bank has unparalleled capabilities among government
agencies in terms of information, experiences, and human resources regarding the
banking industry. There are two camps among financial market experts: one argues
that the central bank is the optimal supervisory agency given an accumulation of
necessary resources, and the other underscores the need for an integrated financial
supervisory system in order to strengthen the international competitiveness of
Indonesia’s financial service industry and to facilitate the development of major
17 At present, banks are supervised and regulated by the central bank, security markets by the Capital
Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam) under the Ministry of Finance, and insurance firms and
pension funds by the Ministry of Finance’s directorate general for financial institutions.
C. After Amendment of the 1999 Central Bank Act (2004–)
Source: The author.
* Only in cases when governors commit prohibited acts and do not resign, the president can
remove them.
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Indonesian banks into universal banks. The idea brought in by the IMF on inte-
grated supervision merits careful consideration in light of Indonesia’s conditions.
B. Introduction of the Deposit Insurance System
The deposit insurance system is generally a matter of argument, particularly with
regard to the scope of insurance coverage and the timing of the system’s introduc-
tion. The early introduction of a generous insurance system can create moral haz-
ards at banks and increase costs for the government, while the lack of a system can
spawn financial unrest. In pre-crisis Indonesia, the only example for reference was
the closure of Bank Summa. Based on this experience, the central bank made the
judgment that the shutdown of 16 banks in November 1997 would cause little trouble
if the same level of protection were provided to small depositors. The measure it
announced involved insurance coverage for deposits of 20 million rupiahs or less,
which covered 93 percent of all depositors. However, unprotected large depositors,
who accounted for 80 percent of the total amount of deposits, put up strong resis-
tance to this measure. Large depositors at other banks also became alarmed, lead-
ing to runs on banks. Then, at the end of January 1998, the central bank finally
introduced a blanket guarantee system for all deposits, and liquidity support loans
provided by the central bank to affected banks during the intervening three months
reached as much as 46 trillion rupiahs (equivalent to 4.5 percent of GDP) (Enoch
2000, p. 5).18
The Letter of Intent to the IMF described the blanket guarantee as a temporary
measure, which would expire by 2004. The government decided to establish a de-
posit insurance agency in 2004, with the phased introduction of a payoff system.
The plan called for the gradual lowering of the ceiling on guaranteed deposits from
the full amount at present to 5 billion rupiahs, to 1 billion rupiahs, and then to 100
million rupiahs (about U.S.$12,000) by 2007. The planned introduction of the pay-
off system has been highly appraised among financial market experts, as it is ex-
pected to encourage depositors to choose good banks, and to make positive contri-
butions to competition and soundness of the banking sector. During the Soeharto
era, when there was no deposit insurance system, the regime tacitly guaranteed the
survival of banks, making depositors oblivious to the need for individual risk man-
agement. With the introduction of the deposit insurance system, the guarantee func-
tion inherent in the Soeharto regime will be shaped into a formal institution, with
depositors given the task of shouldering part of the risk. However, the government
should be careful in setting an appropriate level of guaranteed amount and should
make efforts to have the public fully understand the new system, in order to avoid a
18 This became a big issue later when it was found that a portion of the central bank’s liquidity
support loans had been diverted to purposes other than to boost liquidity, such as debt repayments
and capital flight overseas.
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repetition of the 1997 mistake that led to bank runs by large depositors contrary to
the government’s expectations.
V. FEATURES OF THE MANAGEMENT REFORM OF BANKS
The principal actors in the banking sector are implementing management reforms
in response to the new institutional environment. This section looks at two particu-
lar features of reform commonly found in multiple banks.19 The first is the estab-
lishment of in-house risk management systems, while the second is the expanding
foreign presence in Indonesia’s bank reform. Both show that a fundamental change
is taking place from the pre-crisis standard of bank management.
A. Establishment of an In-House Risk Management System
Although many banks had organizations and procedures for credit management
even before the crisis, they were generally little conscious of risk management.
Changes seen after the crisis include a growing consciousness of risk management,
the launching of corporate efforts toward the establishment of risk management
systems, and associated organizational reform. Several examples follow.
Before the crisis, at the state-owned PT (Persero) Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk
(hereinafter, referred to as BNI), credits were screened by the Credit Control Divi-
sion (Divisi Pengendalian Kredit). However, as one director admitted, there was no
clear sense of risk in the screening operation. After the crisis, as the bank was
required by the government and the IMF to carry out management reform as a
condition for receiving a massive injection of public capital, it implemented an
omni-directional reform covering areas from treasury, organization, and personnel
management to business strategies, and embarked on a path of shedding its old
practices as a state-owned enterprise. It set up the post of risk control director, and
created a Risk Control Division (Divisi Pengendalian Risiko) and Financial Con-
trol Division (Divisi Pengendalian Keuangan) under this director, to clarify respon-
sibilities and organizations for risk management. In addition, it created a Credit
Risk Analysis Unit (Unit Analisis Risiko Kredit) for both corporate and individual
customers under the existing post of director in charge of credit, and increased
personnel involved in credit screening. The new president of the bank, who called
19 The analysis in this section is based on the author’s interviews with directors of the surveyed banks,
as well as annual reports and other materials provided by the banks. The ten surveyed banks are
two state banks (Bank Negara Indonesia, BNI, and Bank Rakyat Indonesia, BRI); two former
business-group-affiliated banks that became foreign-owned after nationalization (Bank Central Asia,
BCA, and Bank Danamon); two private banks that did not undergo reconstruction measures (Bank
Panin and Bank NISP); two recapitalized former business-group-affiliated banks (LippoBank and
PermataBank); a foreign bank branch (Citibank); and the central bank, Bank Indonesia. All were
surveyed in September 2003. For details about reforms at each of these banks, see Sato (2004).
Also see Tim INDEF (2003) for BNI.
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the shots during a series of reform measures, had all bank employees sign a Code of
Conduct in an effort to facilitate the switchover from a bureaucratic to corporate
organization and to boost awareness regarding risk management.20
PT Bank NISP Tbk, an independent bank that remained outside of the bank re-
construction measures, expanded the size of its assets 14-fold over the period of
seven years spanning the crisis. In the process of this rapid expansion, it proactively
pushed the modernization and systematization of management. In 1999 following
the crisis, it developed its own credit screening system. Using customer informa-
tion centralized in the head office, the system automatically evaluates credit appli-
cations with nine-stage scores. Then the Credit Committee considers the evaluation
results and decides on credit advisability and amounts. The key feature of the bank’s
reform is the minimization of discretion by individual bank officials through auto-
matic, systematic, and centralized lending decisions.
As shown by the case of Bank NISP, risk management systems share the com-
mon feature of centralized information control. LippoBank, a recapitalized group-
affiliated bank, established a Central Credit Committee at its head office following
the crisis. The committee meets every Monday for an intensive review of all credits
above a certain amount extended by Thursday of the previous week. BNI’s new
growth strategy also focuses on the centralization of customer information. It was
promoting the decentralization of information management before the crisis, but
switched to a strategy of centralizing customer information after it failed to provide
efficient services to a large number of customers, who returned to state banks amid
the crisis.
PT Bank Central Asia Tbk (hereinafter, referred to as BCA), a foreign-owned,
former business-group-affiliated bank, already had a system for central control of
information in place, and took the next step toward the internal development of
credit screening capacity and the transfer of that capacity to local branches. BCA,
which was once affiliated with Indonesia’s largest Salim Group, had always led the
banking industry in terms of its branch network, number of automatic teller ma-
chines (ATMs), introduction of information technology (IT), and quality of financial
services provided, and had the highest-quality human resources and highest degree
of management systematization. Although it now has new owners and manage-
ment, the scope of its business operations has not changed much, as it inherited
tangible and intangible assets and good corporate customers from the old BCA.
20 In late 2003, a risk control director resigned to take responsibility for an LC (letter of credit)
forgery incident at one of BNI’s branches involving a borrowing company and branch staff. The
incident indicates that even though reform efforts have begun at state banks, outsiders’ views of
state banks have not changed. Some financial sector experts point out that not only depositors but
also borrowing companies continue to seek the “security” of doing business with state banks, and
that companies tend to think delays in loan repayments and other maneuvers are negotiable with
state banks.
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However, there have been some notable changes in the following areas. At the former
BCA, lending decisions were made in a top-down manner, with Anthony Salim,
chief executive officer of Salim Group, being the ultimate risk bearer. Today the
bank is managed under a collective leadership of professional bankers, necessitat-
ing internal risk control capabilities which were not fully developed under Salim’s
leadership. The new BCA, while retaining centralized control of credit informa-
tion, has tried to develop credit screening capacity, and decided to decentralize
lending decisions. With Deutsche Bank providing training as a consultant, it trained
a dozen credit officers who became capable of screening credit applications of be-
tween 10 billion to 20 billion rupiahs from small businesses, conducting market
assessments, and making lending decisions. The bank later sent these credit officers
to local branches in an effort to develop credit screening capabilities at the branch
level.
In the new post-reform situation, many banks have started to make efforts, at
their own expense, toward information control for risk management and for the
development of credit screening systems and capabilities.21
B. The Foreign Presence in Bank Reform
Given the closed nature of Indonesia’s banking sector historically, the significantly
expanded foreign presence as a guide of bank reform is worthy of special mention.
Although foreign banks have not become the sole owners of any Indonesian bank,22
foreign investors and bankers have begun to involve themselves directly in leading
banks as major shareholders, managers, and consultants.
The most remarkable example may be PT Bank Danamon Tbk, which was placed
under foreign-led management. Temasek Group of Singapore, Bank Danamon’s
largest shareholder, seized control rights, sent more than half of the directors and
commissioners, and appointed to the presidency a British banker of Indian descent
who once worked at the London branch of Citibank but had no direct ties with
Temasek. The new president adopted a new business strategy that shifted emphasis
from assets (credits) to liabilities (deposits) and sought to expand services for de-
21 However, this phenomenon has not necessarily been seen at all banks. State-owned Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI), which adopted a new strategy of focusing on micro credit operations, is confident
of the effectiveness of the conventional risk management method, under which specialized Micro
Units make on-the-spot inspections and monitoring, and the customers’ businesses themselves and
the relationship of trust are considered sufficient collateral. Bank Panin, the largest among banks
not undergoing reconstruction measures and a typical model of a family-run bank led by a founder,
has the strength of family-led conservative yet prompt lending decisions. The bank’s approach has
not changed much even after the crisis.
22 In November 2004, a consortium of the British-based Standard Charterd Bank and domestic Astra
Group made a successful bid to purchase 51 percent of PermataBank, one of the recapitalized
former group-affiliated banks. This is the first case a multinational bank appeared as the principal
buyer of Indonesian banks. Yet, it is not a single major owner but shares the ownership half-and-
half with Astra Group.
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positor customers. At the same time, in a departure from the ordinary way of sepa-
rating internal organizations into credits and deposits, he introduced an organiza-
tional structure that would handle both the credits and deposits of individual and of
corporate customers in an integrated manner. The foreign banker, through his bold-
ness, brought a new perspective to the Indonesian banking business. Bank Danamon,
which was once part of a family-controlled business group, shifted to a totally dif-
ferent corporate governance structure under which the foreign manager sought to
achieve business efficiency as a single banking entity, under the watchful eyes of
major foreign shareholders.
The above-mentioned Bank NISP was able to convert itself from a family-run
bank into one with open and modern management in its growth process during the
time of the crisis. This process was also associated with an expanded foreign pres-
ence. After the crisis, IFC and OCBC Bank of Singapore took equity stakes in it.
Following two issuances of new shares, the ratio of publicly listed shares to total
outstanding shares rose to 39 percent, with 95 percent being owned by foreign
investors. The equity share of the founding family, which had been 100 percent
until 1994, declined to as low as 23 percent, and the ownership structure was fully
opened to foreign capital. In the area of management, three of the seven members
of the board became independent commissioners, more than the number required
under regulation. For this, two Americans, one from IFC and one who used to work
at ABN-Amro, and an Indonesian who had a career at an American bank, were
enlisted. The bank also developed its own credit screening system, making use of
the advice provided by IFC and a Swiss financial institution.
LippoBank invited a team of 12 advisers from ANG Bering Bank of Holland
under a three-year contract, and all of the bank’s directors were paired with Dutch
advisers to conduct day-to-day business. This thorough pairing method is said to
have served well not only in introducing new business know-how but also in re-
forming the directors’ consciousness about banking as well as corporate culture.
The pairing idea came from Mochtar Riady, the banker founder of Lippo Group,
who serves as a president commissioner of LippoBank.
At BCA, unlike Bank Danamon, the new management lineup is dominated by
Indonesian nationals, even after becoming foreign-owned. Importantly, however,
three out of eight directors and the president commissioner had careers at foreign
banks, including Citibank and ABN-Amro. Furthermore, as the new owners were
not specialized bankers, Deutsche Bank was appointed to be a consultant as one of
the conditions for their purchase of government-held BCA shares. As discussed
earlier, Deutsche Bank is playing a key role in the internal development of the
credit screening capacity at the new BCA.
Compared with private banks, state banks in general have limited contacts with
foreign interests. In the case of the management reform of BNI, the bank enlisted a
foreign bank’s assistance for the disposal of nonperforming loans and the design of
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the risk management system, and sought a foreign consultancy’s advice in reform-
ing the personnel system. Nevertheless, the extent of the foreign presence was only
partial and temporary. The IMF’s ultimate goal for state bank reform was the public
sale of a majority of equity shares within three years. However, the largest-scale
sale was that of 15 percent of the outstanding shares of Bank Mandiri in 2003; the
sale of a majority of shares in BNI was postponed. The fact that the wheel of state
bank reform has begun to roll is a significant development. Yet, it has to be said that
a long road lies ahead before the intended reform is achieved.
CONCLUSION: EVALUATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM
IN INDONESIA
Following the economic crisis, foreign banks made broad inroads into Asian mar-
kets. In Thailand, major foreign banks purchased private banks one after another,
leaving only the four largest financial conglomerates untouched. In the case of In-
donesia, however, foreign banks were not the principal buyers of former business-
group-affiliated banks. The new owners of these banks are mostly Asian capital,
with foreign banks involved as minority shareholders or consultants, and the man-
agement being entrusted in many cases to groups of multinational professional bank-
ers. Though in such a peculiar form, the full-scale entry of foreign investors and
bankers into the historically exclusive banking sector of Indonesia and their roles as
guides of bank reform are an important change that emerged after the crisis. The
best example is Bank Danamon, where a British banker took the helm of manage-
ment. Also, the significant impact of the foreign presence can be seen at the for-
merly family-run Bank NISP, which was able to achieve a rapid shift to modern
systematized management by making deft use of the input from IFC, a Swiss financial
institution, as well as Indonesian bankers with professional careers at foreign banks.
In this respect, state banks, in comparison with private banks, are still strongly
inward-looking in terms of ownership and management. Though BNI and Bank
Mandiri made fresh starts as huge commercial banks, it will be a major challenge
for them to attain international competitiveness.
One of the characteristics commonly found among the major new actors in the
banking sector is an emerging consciousness of risk in the banking business, backed
with the establishment of risk management systems and associated organizational
reforms. The major challenge confronting Indonesian banks is how to build up
information control capabilities at the head office and credit screening capabilities
at the branch level. Changes can be seen in this respect in that most banks are
making efforts toward these goals at their own expense. The form of organization
where internal risk management capabilities are not required because the govern-
ment (the Soeharto regime) or business group owners stand ready as ultimate risk
bearers, is fast becoming a thing of the past.
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These changes in internal bank organizations are closely linked to institutional
changes in the banking sector as a whole. In the pre-crisis financial institution, the
central bank was positioned at a low rank in the power hierarchy dominated by the
president, the executive body and the Minister of Finance in that order, and was
unable to have single-handed authority for bank supervision. The survival of banks
was guaranteed by the president at the apex of the hierarchy, depositor assets were
protected, and indebted companies could avoid bankruptcy by refinancing loans in
arrears, as long as they cooperated with Soeharto’s developmental regime. This was
how the banking system worked under that regime. The central bank, positioned in
the middle of the hierarchical structure, functioned well as a conduit for develop-
ment funds. However, after the shift to a market orientation, the central bank was
given the difficult task of supervising a large number of new entries without the
effective penalty of forced closure. Considering that the responsibilities of the cen-
tral bank were not specified at that time, it was only natural that it failed to develop
internal supervisory capabilities. Manuals for bank supervision became dead letters.
It can be concluded that the banking system in Indonesia has undergone funda-
mental change as a result of the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the 1998 amend-
ment of the Banking Act and the 1999 enactment of the new Central Bank Act. The
central bank was legally guaranteed of its position as the top authority over the
banking sector and obtained powers to regulate the entry and exit of banks into the
market. With such a legal framework in place, it became able for the first time to
make good use of its internal accumulation of information and human resources.
The introduction of the deposit insurance system offered guarantee, initially full
but partial from 2005 onward, to depositor assets. Furthermore, in the area of cor-
porate debts in arrears to banks, a bankruptcy and arbitration system was intro-
duced to set out market exit rules for failed companies (However, the bankruptcy
system is not adequately functioning, as pointed out by Juwana’s paper in this spe-
cial issue). The full internalized guarantees given to banks, depositors and compa-
nies under the Soeharto regime have now been externalized with an explicit legal
framework, under which banks, depositors and companies are called upon to take
on their respective shares of risks. Amid these changes, the banking sector, which
has been at the core of institutional reforms, seems well ahead of other sectors in
terms of changes. There is no need for premature conclusions on whether all these
institutional mechanisms will function as a single stable system. However, at least
in the banking sector, the central bank as well as individual banks have initiated
efforts to develop risk management capabilities. This should be properly valued,
and the fruits of these efforts should be carefully monitored.
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